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ARGUMENT 
I. That Roosevelt City Of The State Of Utah 
Failed To Prove, By Preponderance Of Evidence, 
Roosevelt Officers Properly Advised Indian's 
Constitutional Rights Prior To Custodial 
Interrogations, And The Statement Made By 
Indianfs Were Voluntary 
Based on Roosevelt City of the State of Utah, absent the 
record of giving of Miranda warnings and any waivers. In Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah, Civil No. 75-C-408 J (Addendum, A, Order 
of September 30, 1997, in Citing Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 
(1991)); and (Addendum, B Order of April 11, 1996, in Citing 
State v. Kozlowicz, 911 P. 2d 1298 (1996)); (Addendum, C Order 
of May 31, 1996, in Citing Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F. 
2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 
(1986)). In the United States District Court, did not have 
benefit and guidance of this Court's decision, in State v. Grey, 
907 P. 2d 951 (1995), the custodial interrogation. 
II. Roosevelt City Of The State Of Utah Argument, 
Indians Should Not Be Applied Retroactively 
Lacks Authority, And Is Contrary To Established 
Precedent 
General rule, is that Roosevelt City Court of the State 
of Utah must apply the law in effect at the time it renders 
its decision. Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 
393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); following in McNeil v. C u m e , 830 
P. 2d 1241, 1245 (1992); also, State v. Cline, 909 P. 2d 1171, 
1177 (1996)(same), continue to give retroactive effect to 
judicial decisions, which is in accordance with U.S. Supreme 
1 
Court's holding in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 
U.S. 86 (1993); Porter v. Galarneau, 911 P. 2d 1143, 1150 (1996), 
that has long stressed need for strict adherence to preservation 
of suspect's rights against self-incrimination. In State v. 
Johnson, 580 P. 2d 12 87 (1978), that stressed burden on law 
enforcement to adopt effective safeguards securing constitutional 
rights against self-incrimination. In State v. Allies, 606 
P. 2d 1043 (1980) and in State v. Grimestead, 598 P. 2d 198 
(1979), the Court cautioned more than mere lip service must 
be paid to Miranda principle embodies. 
III. Roosevelt City Of The State Of Utah Arguments, 
Relative To Roosevelt City Police Interrogation, 
Practice And Instructions Are Not Applicable 
Roosevelt City of the State of Utah police, that common 
practice, may or may not have obtained waivers of rights. These 
officers were not the common practice to obtain from Indian 
suspects written waiver of Miranda rights. Moreover, authorities 
realize benfits reaped by recording advisement of rights and 
any waiver of rights, People v. Raibon, 843 P. 2d 46, 49 (Colo. 
App. 1992)(recording an interview may remove some questions 
with respect to contents of interview, That may be better 
investigative practice to make precise record of any interview); 
State v. James, 858 P. 2d 1012, 1018 (Utah App. 1993)(while 
refraining from requiring recordation of interrogations under 
state constitution, note several policy reasons for recording 
interrogations.); Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 
1988) (that whether to accept or not, statement is electronically 
2 
preserved is important in many contexts.) 
Electronically recording an interrogation serves interests 
of parties and Roosevelt City of the State of Utah Courts. That 
recording protects defendant's constitutional rights, providing 
an objective means for concerning circumstances of confession. 
Stephan v. State, 711 P. 1156, 1161 (Ala. 1985). Indeed, in 
State v. Herms, 904 P. 2d 587 (1995), the tape recording of 
interviews demonstrated police did not advise suspect of 
Miranda warnings, and subsequent statement was found to have 
been involuntarily made. 
IV. Roosevelt City Of The State Of Utah, Attempt To 
Bolster Credibility Of Roosevelt City Officers 
At Indian's And Defense Counsel's Expense Should 
Be Rejected 
The prosecuting attorneys are not at liberty to strike 
hard blows, because of Federal Court Orders, which are in place 
and binding. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). 
It is accurate to state, defense counsel acted in underhanded 
and unethical ways, and absent specific evidence in the records, 
no particular defense counsel can be maligned. Bruno v. Rushen, 
721 F. 2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1983) cert, denied, 469 U.S. 
920 (1984). In United States v. Frederick, 78 F. 3d 1370, 
1379-80 (9th Cir. 1996), Roosevelt City and the State of Utah 
Court labeled as improper prosecution which sought to compliment 
defense counsel on doing good job of confusing witness on stand. 
While these cases addressed inappropriate attacks on the 
rationale, applies with equal vitality to state's accusations 
of unprofessional conduct, made without basis in record and 
3 
for purpose of attacking Indian defendant's credibility. 
V. Roosevelt City Of The State Of Utah, Improperly 
Refers To Factual Matters By Roosevelt City 
In Contempt Of Federal Court In, Ute Indian Tribe 
v. Utah, Civil No. 75-C-408 J, The United States 
District Court Orders And Indians Substantial 
Rights Are Prejudiced 
Roosevelt City of the State of Utah Court reviewed 
transcripts, the same arguments used to support the use of 
Contempt power to enforce subpoenas issued to non-Indians in 
the court's exercise of its ligitimate jurisdiction. 
The power of exclusion might be viewed as quasi-criminal, and 
could be exercised against non-Indians at least to extent, they 
do not have federally-conferred right to be on Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 
144-45 (1982); Hardin v. White Mountain apache Tribe, 779 F. 
2d 476, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1985). The tribe does not have power 
to exclude federal officials engaged in carrying out their 
duties. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F. 
2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986), but did not disclose specific content 
of statements. It is inappropriate for Roosevelt City of the 
State of Utah to disseminate substance of statements. Its only 
purpose can be to prejudice substantial rights of Indians. 
The issue is subject to motion to strike filed with this Reply 
Brief, and disclosures by Roosevelt City of the State of Utah 
should not be considered on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Roosevelt City of the State of Utah police interrogations 
are an important tool of law enforcement. Certainly, Roosevelt 
4 
City officer can not accuse Indian suspects of lying during 
an interrogation, stands far more than proposition Roosevelt 
City police cannot deceive suspect, that teaches given paramount 
importance of rights at stake, willful and conscious decision 
not to record giving of Miranda rights and waiver of such rights 
greatly weakens state's ability to prove, by preponderance of 
evidence, and statements made by suspect voluntarily. Given 
facts of the case, Roosevelt City of the State of Utah willful 
decision not to record interrogation fatally undermines state's 
attempt to prove statements were voluntary. Indian's conviction 
and sentence should be reserved, and case remanded to United 
States District Court with appropriate instructions. 
Respecfully Submitted this^gT^O day of August, 2002. 
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Addendum A; Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, Civil No. 75-C-408 J 
Order of September 30, 1997. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
j j c j ^ s f c j j e j f c s f c j ^ j f c s f c 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-in-Intervention, 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; UINTAH 
COUNTY, apolitical subdivision of the State 
of Utah; ROOSEVELT CITY, a municipal 
corporation; and DUCHESNE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 75-C-408J 
ORDER 
On March 10, 1997, Lynda Kozlowicz filed a paper entitled "Motion for Contempt to Serve 
Supplemental Pleading and Citation to Supplemental Authority," asking leave of this court to serve 
a citation to supplemental authority, specifically Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma. 498 U.S. 505 (1991), as bearing upon the sovereign 
immunity of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
The Court is already aware of the authority, see, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
935 F. Supp. 1473, 1489 n.28 (D. Utah 1996), but sees no problem with granting leave to Ms. 
Kozlowicz to file the papers she has submitted as it appears she seeks no other affirmative relief. 
Therefore, 
/ " / 
IT IS ORDERED that Ms. Kozlowicz's motion for leave to file supplemental authority is 
GRANTED. 
DATED this 3 ^ day of September, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce S. J 
United States or District Judge 
- 2 -
EXHIBIT 
IN THE UNITED .STXTES DISTRICT COURT 
p' -' T • 
r y . 
CE?,., 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
D efendant-in-Intervention, 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah; UINTAH 
COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State 
of Utah, ROOSEVELT CITY, a municipal 
corporation; and DUCHESNE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, 
Defendants. 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAC DIVISION 
Civil No. 75-C-408J 
ORDER 
Edson G. Gardner and Lynda Kozlowicz, two individuals who to date have not been joined 
as parties to the above-captioned proceeding, have filed a series of motions over the last three years 
concerning matters having direct or indirect relationships to the subject-matter of this action Some 
of the motions concern matters which might be more effectively addressed in a separate action 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See, e.g., "Plaintiffs Motion for Emergency Relief," filed 
December 20, 1994 Other motions assert the movant's status as an Indian, a Uintah Band member 
and Aboriginal Uintah Nation Interim Council Member. See, e.g., Edson G. Gardner, Pro-Se, 
Interim Council Member of Aboriginal Uintah Nation, Amici Curiae Motion For Permanent 
Injunction Relief," filed May 2, 1994. Still others remain somewhat unclear. See, e.g., "Motion for 
Criminal Contempt," filed August 18, 1995 
(4 
The court recognizes the gravity of the concerns expressed by Mr. Gardner and Ms. 
Kozlowicz as to the complex jurisdictional questions raised in this case as well as the depth of 
frustration felt concerning the Ute Partition Act and its continuing legacy affecting the lives of 
those who today — fifty years after the demise of the Termination Policy ~ still trace personal, 
family, and cultural roots to the Uintah, Uncompahgre and White River Bands of Ute Indians. 
The court also is aware that these individuals have sought to raise their concerns in the 
context of other proceedings without substantial success. See Gardner v. United States, 25 F.3d 
1056 (Table), 1994 WL 170780 (10th Cir. 1994) (Unpublished Disposition) (No. 93-4102); State 
v. Kozlowicz, 911 P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct. App., Feb 15, 1996). Nevertheless, the court is not 
persuaded that permissive intervention by Mr. Gardner or Ms. Kozlowicz at this stage of this 
proceeding would be conducive to an effective resolution of those issues. This particularly true of 
Mr. Gardner's claims, e.g., that "in the Ute Partition Act Congress has abdicated its constitutional 
power over and duty to the Indians in favor of private corporations in violation of Article I, section 
1 of the constitution." To the extent that the injunctive relief sought in these individual motions 
embraces "a question of law or fact in common" with the parties and issues in this proceeding (Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 24(b)), it overiaps the relief already sought by the Ute Indian Tiibe.1 
At this point, therefore, 
At least on its face, it remains difficult to reconcile the fact setting of State of Utah v. Kozlowicz, 911 
P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct. App., February 15, 1996), in which "an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe" was "arrested and 
charged with speeding, a class C misdemeanor, . . ." (id. at 1299), with the express terms of this court's Order, dated 
September 2, 1992, as modified by this court's Order, dated May 2, 1994 "to allow the State and Local Defendants to 
prosecute/e/ony crimes occurring on lands within the original boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation wrhich are not 
'Indian Country' as defmed by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, et seg " (Emphasis added.) While Herbert Wm. Gillespie, Esq. — who 
has appeared as counsel both in this proceeding and in Kozlowicz — made a verbal request at the August 2, 1994 hearing 
"that misdemeanors be added to that language which would let us then tag the misdemeanor onto the felony prosecutions," 
(Transcript of Hearing, dated August 2, 1994, at 28:19-21), this court did not and has not altered the existing Order to that 
effect. See also Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated April 2, 1996, at 96. Counsel for the Tribe represented that the 
Tribe stands ready to prosecute misdemeanors alleged against tribal members (id. at 27:17-24) and this court's existing 
Order remains in force with that understanding. 
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IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Gardner's Motion to File Amici Curiae Brief of Uintah Mix-
Blood Descendants of the Uintah Valley Reservation, filed May 5, 1993, is GRANTED; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions filed by Mr. Gardner or Ms. 
Kozlowicz are hereby DENIED. 
DATED this // day of April, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
Bruce S. Jenki: 
United States Senior 
- 3 -
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 




' DISTRICT COURT 
ORDER 






UTE INDIAN TRIBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-in-Intervention 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; UINTAH COUNTY, a 
political subdivision of the 
State of Utah; ROOSEVELT CITY, 
a municipal corporation; and 
DUCHESNE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on May 10, 1996, for hearing 
on a Motion for an Order to Show Cause why Roosevelt City and Its 
Attorney, Clark 5. Allred, Should Not be Held in Contempt filed by 
the Ute Indian Tribe ("Tribe") , plaintiff herein. The Motir- ->f 
the Tribe sought contempt sanctions against Roosevelt City and City 
Attorney Allred (hereinafter referred to collectively as "~. 
City") for the City's alleged refusal to comply with this Court's 
Order of April 2, 1996. At the hearing, the Tribe was represented 
by Robert S. Thompson, III, the City by Gayle F. McKeachine ar~ ~:~^ 
State oT""Ut"ah" '~(^Z^^]^Y^~°^ru. Andrews. 
There have been four Orders entered in this proceeding that 
1 
bear upon the Tribe's Motion. Each of those Orders is summarized 
below. 
On September 2, 1992, (nunc pro tunc August 3, 1992) this 
Court entered an Order incorporating a Stipulation that had been 
entered by all of the parties to this litigation. In pertinent 
part, that Order acknowledges that the State, on its behalf and 
that of its political subdivisions, had agreed: 
to refrain from . . . exercising civil or criminal 
jurisdiction in a manner that conflicts with federal law 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, as those boundaries were set forth by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. 
Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) , cert, 
denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986); or from interfering, in any 
way, with the Tribe's exercise of criminal, civil and 
regulatory jurisdiction...within the exterior boundaries 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as those boundaries 
were set froth by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal in 
Ute Indian Tribe, supra. 
See Order at 1-2, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, No. C-75-408J (D. Ut^h 
Sept. 2, 1992, Nunc pro tunc Aug. 3, 1992). 
Following issuance of a decision by the Supreme Court in Haaen 
v. Utah, U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 1580, 128 L.Ed.2d 222 (1994) , and 
at the request of the stat<=> this ^ourt modified its earlier Orae. . 
After a hearing, the September 2, 1992, Order was altered to 
provide that: 
the State and Local defendants [may temporarily] 
prosecute felony crimes occurring on lands within the 
original boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
which are not ^Indian country' as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§§1161 et sea. 
See Order at 1-2, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, No. C-75-408J (D. lJi-
May—2-y- 19 9-4} -(em-pha&i-s—added)-. 
After a hearing called to determine which of the lands within 
2 
the original boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
("Reservation") remained "Indian country" after Haaen v. Utah, 
supra, a new Order was entered in this litigation. The new Order, 
which again modifies the Order of September 2, 1992, permits the 
State and its subdivisions, here the City, to continue to prosecute 
felony crimes, and identifies all of the Reservation as Indian 
country except lands: 
{——— ' ~~~% unalloted and unreserved lands of the Uintah Reservation that were opened to entry in 1905, to the extent that those lands were not later restored to tribal 
ownership or otherwise reincorporated within the 
Reservation by subsequent congressional and 
administrative action . . . 
See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 96, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 
No. 75-C-408J (D. Utah April 2, 1996). 
Finally, this Court had occasion to readdress whether the 
prior Orders entered herein allowed the State, and thereby the 
City, to exercise both felony and misdemeanor jurisdiction within 
the non-Indian country portions of the Reservation in its Order :: 
April 11, 1996. Therein it was emphasized that, since May 2, lOQ4, 
the Stare, and for present purposes the City, had been authorized 
to exercise felony criminal jurisdiction, and felony crini"! 
jurisdiction only, over Indians for alleged offenses committed 
outside Indian country. See Order at 2, n.l, Ute Indian Tribe 
Utah, No. 75-C-408J (April 11, 1996) (stating that the Court "i^i 
not and has not altered the existing Order[s in this action]" to 
permit the State and its political subdivisions to assert 
jurisdiction over misdemeanor crimes occurring ^n lands of the 
Reservation that are outside Indian country). 
3 
Regardless of the content of the Court's early Orders, prior 
to April 2, 1996, there apparently existed some confusion on the 
part of the parties as to whether or not the State and the City 
could exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over Indians on the claimed 
non-Indian country portions of the Reservation. For that reason, 
the City, despite objections from the Tribe and individual Indian 
defendants raised after April 2, 1996, failed to dismiss or 
transfer to the courts of the Tribe its pending misdemeanor cases 
involving Indians. It was at that point that the Tribe filed the 
Motion the subject of this Order. 
Because the Court finds that the City's non-compliance with 
the Orders entered herein may have been inadvertent and the result 
of a misunderstanding of the Court's directions on the part of the 
City, it denies the Tribe's request to hold the City in contempt 
and for sanctions. Denial of the Tribe's Motion does not, hovev^, 
end this matter. 
y ^ ^ There can be no doubt that the City, under the Orders on file 
( herein, has been and is prohibited from prosecuting India/..: ::r 
] misdemeanors alleged to have been committed within the boundaries 
•\ of the Reservation. Any prosecutions done by the City or penu^n^ 
/ before a court of the State are, therefore-, in violation of tr ' 
Court's ruling and directives. 
^ ^ ^T"lT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of Roosevelt and its 
Jattorney, Clark B. Allred, are to immediately file with the 
/ appropriate court (s) of the State motions ^ o dismiss dj.1 
f^  misdemeanor prosecutions of Indians which the City has filed for 
4 
activities allegedly occurring within the boundaries of the Reservation as defined by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Ute Indian Trive v. State of Utah. 113 F.2d 
1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
DATED this £ ' day of -- , - ^ w , , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce S. Jenkins 
United States Senior District Judee 
